Al was de Aribische opstand volgens mij meer iets dat in het gehele midden-oosten speelde en niet specifiek over het Palastijnse probleem ging.
Sowieso is dit onderwerp (tijdsbalk) minder gerelateerd aan WO2.
Is meer gekoppeld aan de nasleep van WO1, na het verslaan van de As-mogendheden (waaronder het Ottomaanse rijk / Turkije, met veel invloed in de genoemde regio)
Wat preciezer in op je vraag gaat hetvolgende stukje op die site:Meanwhile in Arabia, Sharif Hussein was walking a political tightrope. He assured the sultan of his undying support and told him that he was praying for victory against the infidel ("May God lay them low"), but he also kept saying that now was not the time to make the call for a holy war. Simultaneously he exchanged several letters with the new British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon. McMahon agreed to "recognize and support the independence of the Arabs," and made vague promises to set up Hashemite-ruled Arab kingdoms in Arabia, Syria, and Iraq after the war. However, there was also a string attached--McMahon told Hussein that the eastern shore of the Mediterranean had a population that was not predominantly Arab, which would exclude it from any future Arab state. Hussein countered by saying that the Turkish vilayets (provinces) of Aleppo and Beirut (northern Syria and Lebanon) were indeed Arab territories, and must be included; McMahon replied that the matter "will require careful consideration." At no point did either of them mention Palestine, Jerusalem, or the Jews. From the Arab point of view the Holy Land had always been part of Syria, so this omission meant nothing to Hussein. Nevertheless, McMahon, with that splendidly imperial attitude that was natural to Englishmen back then, did not take his promises very seriously. This was the first of many misunderstandings that would lead to trouble.
The Arab Revolt
Wartime politics divided the Arabs. The Imam Yahya of Yemen and Ibn Rashid of northern Arabia were pro-Turkish, while al-Idrisi of Asir and Ibn Saud declared themselves in the Allied camp by the end of 1914. To complete the picture, the sheikhs of coastal protectorates like Kuwait were pro-British, and in Mecca sat Sharif Hussein. Of all these, only the Imam had more than a handful of troops, and none did anything that affected the war before the summer of 1916. For example, in July 1915 the Imam invaded British-held southern Yemen, occupying Lahej but not Aden; Turkish troops remained in Lahej for the rest of the war. Offshore, British ships controlled the Red Sea and blockaded Turkish-held towns along the coast.
As for Hussein, time was running out on the fence-sitting game. When Jemal Pasha's first attack on Egypt failed, he withdrew to Syria and began preparing for a second invasion. While doing so Jemal discovered underground Arab anti-Turkish activities. His response was a wave of repression that earned him the nickname of al-Jazzar, "the butcher." Jemal burned down villages and deported their inhabitants to Turkey; thirty-two prominent Arab civilians were executed; Arab units in the Ottoman army were moved out of Syria and replaced with Turks.
Jemal Pasha also announced that he would send a large Turko-German force to the Hejaz on its way to Yemen. Hussein decided to act when he heard the news. On June 10, 1916, Hussein declared himself in revolt by symbolically firing a rifle at the Turkish barracks in Mecca. The rebels quickly took Mecca and Jedda, but that was the limit of their ability. The ill-trained and ill-equipped Bedouins were brave enough when attacking lightly-armed soldiers, but they often ran away from artillery. After one such episode, the Arabs explained that they had "withdrawn to make ourselves some coffee."
For the Arab revolt to succeed it would need gold, arms, and advice. All that was on the way with an agent named T. E. Lawrence. The illegitimate son of an Anglo-Irish baronet, Lawrence had spent the years before 1914 traveling around the Middle East, studying archeology and Arabic language and history--and incidentally, spying on the Turks. When the war broke out, he used his talents to become a temporary captain in the intelligence service, stationed first in Cairo, and then Jedda in October 1916. There he quickly made up his mind about the Hashemite family. In his book on the Arab revolt, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, he wrote:
"The first, the Sharif of Mecca, we knew to be aged. I found Abdullah the second son too clever, Ali the first son too clean. Zaid the fourth son too cool. Then I rode up-country to Faisal the third son and found in him the leader with the necessary fire."
Prince Faisal now became the leader of the Arab revolt against the Turks. Lawrence learned to wear Arab clothing and ride camels, and thus turned himself into a Bedouin warrior. Together Faisal and Lawrence led successful guerilla raids, blowing up trains and railroad tracks, and attacking isolated Turkish units. Nevertheless, the legend of "Lawrence of Arabia" belongs more to Western literature than it does to Arab history. Lawrence respected Arab culture, but his first loyalty was always to Britain; he wore an Arab headdress not out of love for the Arabs, but because they respected and trusted him when he did. Lawrence wanted independent Arab states in the Middle East because the most likely alternative would have been French colonies (he hated the French as much as he hated the Turks). The reason why books and movies exist about Lawrence is because German and Allied troops were monotonously slaughtering one another in the mud of Flanders, and the West desperately needed a hero who could work miracles elsewhere. To most Arabs, however, the "Lawrence of Arabia" story is overshadowed by the betrayal of the postwar settlement.